The Evolution of Innovation and the Evolution of Regulation: Emerging Tensions and Emerging Opportunities in Communications by Downes, Larry & Mayo, John W.
  
10 
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF REGULATION: EMERGING 
TENSIONS AND EMERGING 

























                                                            
 * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Federal Communications Com-
mission/Institute for Information Policy Conference on "The Future of Broadband Regula-
tion" in May 2014. We are very grateful to Anna Potter for excellent research assistance. 
We alone are responsible for any errors or omissions. 
 ** Senior Industry and Innovation Fellow, Georgetown Center for Business and Public 
Policy; and Professor of Economics, Business and Public Policy, Georgetown University, 
McDonough School of Business, and Executive Director, Georgetown Center for Business 
and Public Policy, respectively. 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 11 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The disruption of an industry’s core technologies inevitably creates tension 
for regulatory institutions.  This is especially true for sectors experiencing per-
sistent disruptive innovation -- the defining feature of the communications in-
dustry for at least the last two decades.1  In very short order, a century of 
switched voice communication networks have been supplanted by new, pack-
et-based networks transporting voice, video and data interchangeably, render-
ing the legal and regulatory framework of the switched-voice era increasingly 
strained.2  
In particular, the simultaneous transition and convergence of computing and 
communications networks to Internet Protocol (IP) – based technologies has 
created a robust new network architecture that continues to sow radical disrup-
tion among long-standing business models in the communications sector.3  Of 
course, the IP revolution, still in progress, has drastically improved the quality 
and value of communications goods and services that consumers demand.4  But 
at the same time, not surprisingly, it has fundamentally changed the economics 
of the industry.5 By virtually all accounts, the innovations spawned by this re-
markable new platform for economic growth and consumer surplus is also 
warping both the structure and value proposition of existing regulatory sys-
tems.6  Substantive public policy challenges arise because rules and rulemaking 
processes fashioned in the monopoly era of telephony contemplate a set of 
regulatory trade-offs and consumer choices that are no longer accurate, or in 
                                                            
 1 Gillaume Villon de Benveniste, Disruptive Innovations are Undermining the Busi-
ness Model of Telecommunications Companies, According to Gilles Negrel, THE INNOVA-
TION AND STRATEGY BLOG, http://bit.ly/1sM5pww. 
 2 See generally LARRY DOWNES & PAUL NUNES, BIG BANG DISRUPTION: STRATEGY IN 
THE AGE OF DEVASTATING INNOVATION 28-29 (Portfolio Hardcover, 2014) (comparing tradi-
tional taxi businesses attempts to have regulators ban the new technology-based dispatching 
taxi businesses, such as Lyft, SideCar and Uber, rather than competing with the new ser-
vices). 
 3 See id. at 2 (claiming the source of disruption is the “programmable smartphone, a 
hybrid computing and communications device”). 
 4 Zack Christenson, FCC: Get With the IP Revolution, ACI (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/16oy1BN. 
 5 Id. Stating that: 
[L]everaging the power of IP (or internet protocol), systems like Skype, Vonage and a 
host of others have left consumers wondering why exactly they still pay for a legacy 
phone system. Major Internet service providers like Comcast have been offering their 
version of IP-based telephone as part of basic packages. Telephone industry giants like 
Verizon and AT&T have been pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure investment 
to keep pace. 
Id. 
 6 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANA-
LYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 199-200 (Princeton University Press, 2002) 
(applying standard tools of microeconomic analysis to the innovation process). 
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many cases necessary.7  
This incongruity has created tangible regulatory asymmetries.  For example, 
wireline telephony provided by a “telco” is regulated by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) under Title II of the Communications Act,8 while 
the same communication carried by a cable-telephony provider or over-the-top 
Internet service using IP technology is not subject to Title II.9  For backward-
looking reasons, mobile, wireline, satellite and cable services are subject to 
different regulations enforced by different regulators and bureaus.10 Video and 
data services are subject to entirely different rules and rule makers, often de-
pending on the technology of delivery even as those networks converge.11  
The resulting systems of regulatory governance are incontrovertibly com-
plex. This complexity substantially raises the economic and social costs of 
regulation both to the producers and consumers of hundreds of billions of dol-
lars worth of modern communications services.12  If the benefits generated by 
the complex system of regulatory controls exceed their corresponding costs, 
then exporting these regulations into the future for new and emerging services 
may be warranted. If not, however, then there is no economic justification for 
extending them.13   
The weight and import of this fundamental question, posed at a defining 
moment in the history of the communications industry, has correctly provoked 
calls for a serious reassessment of legacy communications governance struc-
tures, and specifically whether they continue to provide a sound foundation for 
advancing fundamental policy goals: “to make available, so far as possible, to 
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reason-
able charges.”14   
Accordingly, it is essential to establish a logical and dispassionate frame-
work to evaluate whether the existing governance structure both provides a 
robust platform for maximizing consumer value and promotes continued inno-
vation. In this article, we seek to advance such a discussion in two important 
respects.  First, we describe the changing nature of innovation in the communi-
                                                            
 7 Christenson, supra note 4. 
 8 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. §§ 201, 543-44, 701-57, 1021-1205. 
 11 See id. § 151 (Sec. 1105 (5)(D) Definitions). 
 12 Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in, THE 
LIMITS AND COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 48, 52-53 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 2005). 
 13 For a compelling case for the consideration of benefits and costs to determine the 
scope of regulation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (2013) 
(section V infra describes the relationship between our framework and the tools of benefit 
cost analysis). 
 14 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1063, 1064 (1934). 
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cations sector, which we believe provides critical background information for 
policy deliberations.  Understanding disruptive innovation is critical, as it is 
now the defining feature of this sector.  Any serious 21st century communica-
tions policy must envelop, embrace and act to encourage this innovation.  
Second, we offer a policy framework capable of guiding sound regulatory 
policies in a world of continuing and accelerating technological innovation.15  
Importantly, this framework, referred to as Results-Based Regulation (RBR), is 
divorced from mercurial ideological drivers that have too often directed policy 
changes in the past.  It constructs neither a regulation-free altar at which stake-
holders can worship, nor does it reflexively embrace ritualistically extending 
existing regulatory structures into the future simply because they have histori-
cal precedent.  
Rather, the RBR approach recognizes the imperfections, in practice, of all 
governance institutions – both markets and regulatory.  To minimize the costs 
of these imperfections, RBR relies on principles that weigh the factual consid-
eration of when and where more - or less - regulatory intervention in the indus-
try will increase economic welfare.  This determination requires empirical, not 
ideologically-driven, analysis.  It also requires disciplined deliberations that are 
firmly rooted in economically sound principles.   
While a complete application of the RBR approach to the wide range of sub-
stantive communications issues before policymakers today is beyond the scope 
of this article, we seek here to provide a “proof of concept” of the applicability 
of the framework.  Whether the issue is ensuring universal service, the relative 
value of adapting Title I or Title II of the Communications Act to Internet-
provided services, establishing the appropriate policy path for the transition to 
an all-IP industry, net neutrality, spectrum management, transaction review or 
any number of other salient issues before the Commission, the application of 
RBR principles provides a platform for improved decision making by policy-
makers.16  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II describes the 
evolution of disruptive technological innovation, for which the communica-
tions sector regularly serves as a petri dish.  Section III turns to a high-level 
discussion of the evolution of regulation in the communications industry and 
the growing strains on regulatory institutions caused by the fast-changing tech-
nology of communications services. This discussion is not meant to be com-
prehensive, but rather highlights some of the incongruities and tensions that 
                                                            
 15 See John W. Mayo, The Evolution of Regulation: Twentieth Century Lessons and 
Twenty-First Century Opportunities, 65 FED. COMM. L.J. 119, 136-45 (2013) (introducing 
the framework for twenty-first century policymaking for the first time). 
 16 See id. at 147 (stating the RBR principles are “likely to be a useful guide to policy-
makers today” in deciding how much regulations is necessary). 
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affect the industry today as a result of rapid disruptive change.  Section IV 
provides a description of the economic principles-based framework (RBR) we 
propose to guide the sound evolution of regulation in the industry going for-
ward.  This section will also highlight “results-based” lessons from communi-
cations policy that provide guidance as policymakers consider next steps to 
evolve the current regulatory apparatus for communications.  Importantly, ap-
plication of the framework has the potential not only to accommodate exoge-
nous innovation but also to evolve over time to complement and enhance that 
innovation without substantial policy gridlock. In Section V, we briefly com-
pare our approach with a sampling of other frameworks that have recently been 
advanced. Section VI concludes.   
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION 
For millennia, economic growth in the world was approximately zero.17  Be-
ginning with the Industrial Revolution, however, dramatic increases in eco-
nomic welfare occurred in a number of countries around the world.18  While 
scholars debate the relative contributions of a variety of sources for this eco-
nomic growth, that innovation is a substantive, if not primary, driver is beyond 
doubt.19  But innovation is, by its very nature, disruptive, proceeding, in the 
famous formulation of Joseph Schumpeter, in “perennial gale of creative de-
struction,” which Schumpeter saw as capitalism’s “essential fact.”20  It chang-
es, often dramatically, both the way firms do business and the way that con-
sumers consume goods and services. These changes strain the economic and 
regulatory institutions designed around business models and patterns of con-
sumption as they existed prior to the arrival of the disruptors.  
The accident-prone intersection of innovation and regulation is poorly un-
derstood.21  Indeed, while comprehensive literatures have developed on both 
regulation and innovation, their nexus has drawn relatively little scholarly at-
tention.22 Yet, it is clear that regulatory design has the potential both to enable 
                                                            
 17 GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
1-2 (Joel Mokyr ed., Princeton University 2007). 
 18 See id. 
 19 BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 11-13. 
 20 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83-84, 87, (1942). 
 21 See generally DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 71-72 (discussing governmental 
oversight resulting in delays of innovation or not reaching the potential of “more efficient, 
technology-driven alternatives”). 
 22 See Luke Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States: A 
Cross-Industry Literature Review, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 8 (2010), 
http://bit.ly/1wTkXzL (surveying the existing literature); see also John W. Mayo & Joseph 
E. Flynn, The Effects of Regulation on R&D: Theory and Evidence, 61 J. OF BUS. 321, 323 
(1988), available at http://bit.ly/1BPZSaP (stating that regulatory effects on innovation has 
received limited attention). 
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and accelerate innovation or to deter it, and that these effects may be intention-
al or unintentional.23   In mature industries where core technologies have stabi-
lized, the risk that regulatory design will impede innovation is relatively mod-
est.24  In other industries that risk is more profound.  To get a feel for the rele-
vance of the innovation/regulation tension in the communications industry as it 
transitions from a set of siloed products and services and distinct technologies 
to a single dynamic IP-platform, we highlight foundational innovations whose 
pervasive and disruptive impacts are often taken for granted.25  
Our analysis derives from a recent and ongoing multi-industry study of dis-
ruptive innovation conducted by one of the authors in collaboration with the 
Accenture Institute for High Performance.26  That study reveals that in a grow-
ing number of industries, innovation has fostered a new era of ultra-
competitiveness, driven not by static academic approaches to strategic plan-
ning but by the largely uncontrollable force of technologies that continuously 
generate dramatic, if not fully exponential, improvements in price and perfor-
mance.27 
Chief among these disruptive platforms are computer processors and related 
technologies including storage, memory, displays, sensors, and broadband 
networks.  Digital technologies continue to follow the radical prediction of 
Intel co-founder Gordon Moore, who wrote in 1965 that economies of scale in 
semiconductor manufacturing, along with miniaturization of components, 
would for the foreseeable future allow chip producers to market processors 
with twice the computing capacity every twelve to eighteen months, while 










                                                            
 23 Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Moneyball for State Regulators, NAT’L AFFAIRS 
1 (forthcoming 2014); Stewart, supra note 22. 
 24 See Stewart, supra note 22 (discussing the easing of burden on innovation within the 
genetically engineered microorganism industry). 
 25 DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 3. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 2. 
 28 Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 86 PROC. 
OF THE IEEE 82, 83 (1965), http://bit.ly/1GIDVsm 






















Figure 1 – Moore’s Law (Source:  Downes & Nunes, “Big Bang Disrup-
tion”) 
 
Fifty years of continued application of the faster-cheaper-smaller principle 
of Moore’s Law has created the information revolution experienced by con-
sumers in much of the world.29  Even without adjusting for inflation, computer-
intensive products and services, encompassing much of the computing, con-
sumer electronics and entertainment industries, continue to become better and 
cheaper in each of increasingly short new product cycles.30  Consumers now 
expect the phenomenon to continue and even punish industry leaders if they 
feel any hesitation on the part of suppliers to cannibalize existing products and 
markets with new and better products.31  In that environment, today’s market 
dominator can quickly become tomorrow’s also-ran.  
As embedded computing capacity becomes an increasingly important com-
ponent of products and services far from traditional electronics markets—
including automotive, manufacturing, agriculture, consumer products, energy, 
                                                            
 29 Raj Sabhlok, Moore’s Law is Just the Beginning (For Apps), FORBES (Apr. 25, 2013, 
10:00 AM), http://onforb.es/1DCfJvA. 
 30 DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 1. 
 31 Id. at 28. 
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and health care—the digital revolution is becoming a central driver of econom-
ic performance, growth, and wealth creation for an ever-widening array of 
goods and services in the economy, and for both developed and developing 
nations.32 
Of central importance to regulators, the introduction of new goods that are 
both better and cheaper right from the beginning is changing the nature of 
competition.  Incumbents who could once rely on scale and high switching 
costs to produce only incrementally improved products while comfortably 
maintaining profit margins now find that life-cycles have become shorter and 
customers defiantly disloyal.33  In goods including games, electronics, and 
smartphones, the jump to better and cheaper alternatives, even from new en-
trants, can be sudden, crossing all traditional marketing segments from early 
adopter to laggard.34   
Beyond these traditionally hypercompetitive industries, the dramatic explo-
sion of mobile broadband devices and networks has given software and hard-
ware based companies new opportunities to exploit inefficiencies in more sta-
ble industries.35  Innovators are now using that platform to introduce more con-
sumer-friendly interfaces that are disrupting services,36 including hotels, taxi-
cabs, professional services, energy and even health care.  It is no exaggeration 
to say that the very idea of industry is now under extreme pressure, a category 
five storm of “creative destruction.”37  
Nowhere is the better and cheaper transformation of industry, known as 
“Big Bang Disruption,” more visible than in the industries overseen directly 
                                                            
 32 Id. at 48. 
 33 Julia Hanna, What Loyalty? High-End Customers are First to Flee, HARV. BUS. SCH. 
(May 16, 2011), http://hbs.me/1vSFGwK . 
 34 Improving FCC Process: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Commc’n. and 
Tech. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 19-20 (2013) (testimony of Larry 
Downes, Internet Industry Analyst and Author). 
 35 Emerging Devices for Mobile Broadband, AT&T, http://soc.att.com/1BLcH3c (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014); see, e.g., Mobile Hotspots, NETGEAR, http://bit.ly/1wTqCGj (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014) (“AirCard devices turns wireless connection into a mobile hotspot 
that supports any WiFi enabled device. Not only laptops, but also digital cameras, PDAs, 
tablets, printers and game consoles can now connect to the Internet through high speed mo-
bile broadband networks whenever and wherever.”). 
 36 See Jamie Scheu, Download Your Next New Car, HILL HOLIDAY, 
http://bit.ly/1wTqLcz (last visited Oct. 4, 2014); on car insurance services: 
Relative newcomer Automatic provides similar functionality with a slick smartphone-
app display layer. At the heart of all of these services is a hardware accessory that 
plugs directly into a vehicle’s on-board diagnostic port. And as such, these offerings 
can soon be replaced by software apps in modern vehicles whose APIs provide access 
to the very same information through a much more consumer-friendly interface. 
Id. 
 37 Peter Cukor, et al., Telecoms in Transition: Survival and Success in the Global Inter-
net Economy, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 106 (2000) (discussing economist Joseph 
Schumpeter’s argument known as “creative destruction”). 
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and indirectly by the FCC—communications, computing, entertainment and 
other forms of information creation, distribution and consumption.38   As prices 
for voice, video and data transmission continue to plummet at a pace that ap-
proximates Moore’s Law,39 (see Figure 2) incumbents have scrambled to rein-
vent their businesses from within what are often closely-regulated constraints.40  
As content providers, device manufacturers, and operating system developers 
increase their competitive leverage, traditional voice, video and data carriers 
have diversified into new businesses and new technologies, now offering digi-
tal voice and multi-channel video services, for example, and some of the most 





















Figure 2 – Price per Mbps:  The Collapsing Price of Internet Transit 
(Source:  Bill Norton, Peering Playbook, 2011) 
                                                            
 38 DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
 39 See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions, 
Sixteenth Report, WT Docket No. 11-186 (Terminated) 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 3700, paras. 265-66 
(Mar. 21, 2013) (reporting declines in services) [hereinafter Sixteenth Annual Competition 
Report]. 
 40 Charles H. Fine & John M. de Figueiredo, Can We Avoid Repeating the Mistakes of 
the Past in Telecommunications Regulatory Reform? 8 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Commc’ns 
Futures Program, Working Paper No. 2005-001, 2005), available at http://bit.ly/1IUpwgz. 
 41 Robert Frieden, The Impact of Next Generation Television on Consumers and the 
First Amendment, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 62, 80 (2013). 
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As Figure 2 shows, the price of Internet transit fell from $1,200 in 1998 to 
less than a dollar by 2013.  While consumers do not see this deflation directly, 
the impact on their behavior has been dramatic and unmistakable.42  Infor-
mation consumption has exploded by orders of magnitude, particularly in mo-
bile applications, the source of a virtuous cycle of continued innovation.43  
Since the 2007 introduction of Apple’s iPhone and the subsequent release of 
Google’s Android operating systems, smartphone penetration in the U.S. has 
risen rapidly to over fifty-eight percent of all adults, with most consumers ac-
quiring and using the device not as phones but as data devices (see Figure 3).44  
With U.S. leadership in 4G LTE deployment, mobile networks are fast becom-






















                                                            
 42 See IP Transit Prices Declines Steepen, TELEGEOGRAPHY (Aug. 02, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/1sw7a0x (showing how prices for wholesale IP transit service continue to de-
cline throughout the world); see also Nick Bilton, Part of the Daily American Diet, 34 Gi-
gabytes of Data, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2009, at B6. 
 43 Sarah Perez, Majority of Digital Media Consumption now Takes Place in Mobile 
Apps, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 21, 2014), http://tcrn.ch/1ABeHuJ. 
 44 Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, 
http://pewrsr.ch/OotDJE (last visited May 21, 2014). 
 45 See Sixteenth Annual Competition Report, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 3700, para. 87. 



































Figure 3 – U.S. Smartphone Penetration by Demographic Category (2014) 
(Source:  Pew Research Center Internet Project).  Note: Percentages marked 
with a superscript letter (e.g., a) indicate a statistically significant difference 
between that row and the row designated by that superscript letter, among cat-
egories of each demographic characteristic (e.g., age). 
 
Communications technologies and their associated industries are now in the 
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midst of their most profound technological transformation in over a century.46  
The old public-switched telephone network (PSTN) is joining other obsolete 
networking technologies in converting to the packet-switched network proto-
cols of the Internet.47  Analog equipment is being replaced with digital; copper 
is being replaced or supplemented with fiber optic cable, satellite, cable and 
cellular technologies.48  Voice, video and data are converging onto a single 
standard, and moving over a single global network infrastructure.49   
The emerging communications infrastructure is exponentially more effi-
cient, extendable, and powerful than the separate, aging networks it is or has 
replaced.50  It offers new services that were unimaginable just a few years ago, 
including real-time video chat, entertainment programming on demand, tele-
medicine, distance education, smart grids, and machine-to-machine communi-
cations--and promises to accelerate its offerings in the coming decade.51   It is 
generating profound economic growth and new competitive advantages for 
businesses that are leading the revolution.52  
The nature of data, voice and video communications has changed utterly.53 
Wireline voice networks that were once isolated as a matter of technology, 
application, and law, increasingly provide services and functionality that ap-
pear to the consumer to be the same as services provided by mobile, cable and 
other broadband networks.54   The result is that American consumers are enjoy-
                                                            
 46 See DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
 47 See Sixteenth Annual Competition Report, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 3700, para. 25. 
 48 See id. at n.416, paras. 216, 333, 335 Appendix A. 
 49 See id. para. 6. 
 50 See Patrick McLaughlin, Why the Copper-vs.-Fiber War is Over, CABLING INSTALLA-
TION & MAINTENANCE (July 1, 2001), http://bit.ly/1BLeC7S (“every manufacturer in our 
industry sees where we are headed…optical fiber is the only medium that will handle 10-
Gigabite Ethernet.”); see Sixteenth Annual Competition Report, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 3700, para. 
87. 
 51 Albert Costil, 7 Video Chat Apps You Should Have on Your Smartphone, SEARCH 
ENGINE J., http://bit.ly/1wywcfc (last visited Oct. 23, 2014); X1 On Demand Menu – Watch 
TV Shows and Movies, COMCAST, http://bit.ly/1AdUmuA (last updated Oct. 7, 2014, 2:48 
PM); Todd Hixon, Why is Telemedicine Suddenly Hot?, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://onforb.es/1wtyrjf; Distance Education at Harvard Extension, HARV. EXTENSION SCH., 
http://bit.ly/1hg4UoE (last visited Oct. 23, 2014); Smart Grid, ENERGY.GOV, 
http://1.usa.gov/1qiT80s (last visited Oct. 23, 2014); Connected Machines. Unlocked Poten-
tial, VERIZON, http://vz.to/1mIWXdK (last visited Oct. 23, 2014); see Shirley Siluk, Sam-
sung Develops Tech to Boost Wi-Fi Speeds Fivefold, TOP TECH NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014, 9:33 
AM), http://bit.ly/1xlZhw3 Samsung is planning to implement newly developed technology 
to boost Wi-Fi speeds “as early as next year.” Id. 
 52 Telecom industries that invest in the expansion of technology, updated infrastructure, 
and rapid innovation will see profits and value creation. See 2014 Outline on Telecommuni-
cations: Interview With Craig Wigginton, DELOITTE, http://bit.ly/1nLezpA (last visited Oct. 
23, 2014). 
 53 Larry Downes, FCC refuses to state the obvious: Mobile market is competitive, 
CNET (Apr. 3, 2013, 7:57 AM), http://cnet.co/1yUcsj7. 
 54 Id. 
22 The Evolution of Innovation and the Evolution of Regulation [Vol. 23 
ing the benefits of intensely competitive providers for all manner of communi-
cation and information services.55   
While phone companies once dismissed the Internet as an inferior commu-
nications protocol for voice, carriers large and small have now embraced it.56  
As switched network technology matured, IP has zoomed ahead, supporting 
exploding demands from consumers, small businesses, cloud-based services, 
and the coming deluge of machine-to-machine communications known as “the 
Internet of Things.”57 This new ecosystem is emerging organically from the 
deployment of robust, global broadband IP networks, a dividend from over $1 
trillion in private funding invested in IP-based technologies in the first decade 
of the commercial Internet.58   
These disruptors are unique in economic history in that they emerge both 
better and cheaper than established products and technologies.59  As a result, in 
a matter of months or even weeks, consumers can abandon the old for the new, 
leaving their current providers little time or opportunity to respond.60  The re-
sult is often the decimation of long-standing industry supply chains. 
Consider the smartphone and the havoc it has wrought.  A single device cat-
egory has disintermediated products and services such as address books, video 
cameras, pagers, wristwatches, maps, books, travel games, flashlights, home 
telephones, Dictaphones, cash registers, Walkmen, day timers, alarm clocks, 
answering machines, yellow pages, wallets, keys, phrase books, transistor ra-
dios, personal digital assistants, dashboard navigation systems, remote con-
trols, newspapers, magazines, directory assistance, travel and insurance agents, 
restaurant guides and pocket calculators— just to name a few.61 As these ex-
amples suggest, the communications industry is being affected more profound-
ly than any other by disruptive technological innovation.  It perfectly fits the 
                                                            
 55 Id. 
 56 AT&T VoIP Services, AT&T, http://soc.att.com/1wUCwiX (last visited Oct. 23, 
2014) (“VoIP from AT&T converts your voice into data and uses your high speed Internet 
connection to send and receive calls.”); VoIP Growing Statistics, SIPNOLOGY, 
http://bit.ly/1GK0Ymu (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (“Although many operators have so far 
resisted the use of VoIP services over mobile phones, it has been suggested that such a 
stance will not last long and in the years to come VoIP will be widespread on mobile 
phones.”). 
 57 See Internet of Things (IoT), CISCO.COM, http://bit.ly/1neRisN (last visited Sep. 15, 
2014); see also CREATING THE INTERNET OF YOUR THINGS, MICROSOFT WHITE PAPER 3 
(2014), available at http://bit.ly/OdHUs5. 
 58 See REED HUNDT & BLAIR LEVIN, THE POLITICS OF ABUNDANCE: HOW TECHNOLOGY 
CAN FIX THE BUDGET, REVIVE THE AMERICAN DREAM AND ESTABLISH OBAMA’S LEGACY 9 
(2012). 
 59 See DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
 60 See id. at 1-3. 
 61 See id. at 1; see also Sixteenth Annual Competition Report, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 3700, 
paras. 5-6 (discussing the mobile wireless ecosystem of voice, messaging, and data services 
offerings now available on mobile wireless devices). 
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pattern of gradual then sudden industry transformation called Big Bang Dis-
ruption.62   
The disruptive nature of innovation in the communications sector is exciting 
for consumers and anxiety-inducing for regulators.  In this regard, the case for 
policy realignment is made all the more compelling by the emerging reality 
that disruptive innovation is not a series of “one-off” developments but rather 
has become routinized.  In Big Bang Disruption, innovation has itself become 
“one of the primary weapons of competition” among rivals in modern high-
tech industries.63 The result is that competition among firms to innovate on 
product and service rivalry benefits consumers, who capture much of the sur-
plus value of better and cheaper offerings.64 “Routinized” disruption, as Wil-
liam Baumol calls it, has the effect of constraining individual firm profits just 
as with more traditional forms of price competition.65 According to Baumol 
  
If entry into innovative activity is absolutely free, then ex ante, the 
representative firm must expect no more than the rate of profit cur-
rently earned in other competitive industries from its routine in-
ventive/innovative activity, no matter how rapid the rate of techno-
logical progress it is able to achieve … Routinized innovation in such 
circumstances, promises no more profit than similarly routinized out-
lays on machinery or marketing.66    
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION 
In striking contrast to the explosion of innovation that defines the communi-
cations markets, the corresponding regulatory structures generally change at 
near-glacial pace.67  This is, of course, partly unavoidable.  The regulatory pro-
cess by its very nature is a public, deliberative and inclusive process.68 The re-
sult is that regulatory policymaking will typically involve numerous time-
                                                            
 62 See DOWNES & NUNES, supra note 2, at 111-12. 
 63 BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 4, 7, 11. 
 64 Anna-Marie Kovacs, Ph.D., Telecommunications Competition: The Infrastructure-
Investment Race, INTERNET INNOVATION ALLIANCE 5 (Oct. 8, 2013), http://bit.ly/1zj5kAI. 
 65 See generally, BAUMOL, supra note 6, at 31 (introducing Baumol’s theory of rou-
tinized innovation). 
 66 Id. Note that while, the relationship between innovation and competition was first 
famously described by Joseph Schumpeter, the routinized innovation in modern high-tech 
industries is quite different than the extra-ordinary returns envisioned by Schumpeter to 
flow to a sole innovator. Id. 
 67 Economides, supra note 12, at 52-53. 
 68 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 238-39 (1946) 
(outlining the procedural process of regulating); see also 5 U.S.C §§ 551-59 (2012) (outlin-
ing the procedural rule making process for federal agencies including, requirements for 
public notice and input). 
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consuming steps.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a Notice of Inquiry 
is followed by a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, followed by a Public Com-
ment period, followed by an Order, Requests for Reconsideration, legal chal-
lenges and, finally, implementation.69  
Despite these procedural constraints, policymakers still have considerable 
discretion and ability to evolve regulation to match the changing dynamics of 
industries and the ecosystems they spawn.70  Indeed they must do so, or face 
the prospect that as technological change accelerates, the likelihood similarly 
increases that slower-moving regulators will unintentionally harm rather than 
promote consumer and economic welfare.  Both Democratic and Republican 
leaders dating back at least as far as Jimmy Carter have recognized the risk 
associated with different clock speeds of innovation and regulation.71  More 
recently, then Senator Barack Obama observed that “[t]he problem is we still 
have a[n] archaic, 20th-century regulatory system for 21st-century…markets.”72  
Examples of economic harm resulting from regulatory inertia are not diffi-
cult to identify either in general, or specifically within the communications 
sector. For instance, even as technological improvements are creating remark-
able opportunities for consumers and businesses to maximize the utilization of 
expensive capital assets in what is known as the “sharing economy,” state and 
local regulators struggle to determine how, if at all, new services including 
Uber and Airbnb fit within their jurisdiction and regulatory corpus.73  Encour-
aged by regulated incumbents, some local regulators have called on the inno-
vators to slow down, or even stop, while the system tries to catch up.74 The 
communications sector is not immune to this inertia. For example, in 1984, 
AT&T was divested from the Bell Operating Companies and in a stroke the 
economic rationale for regulating AT&T as a monopoly provider – the owner-
ship of a monopoly bottleneck access to the local loop – ended.75  Yet it was 
                                                            
 69 See §§ 551-59. 
 70 See generally Mayo, supra note 15, at 120-21 (discussing how ideological motivation 
of regulators has shaped policy in the last fifty years); see also Downes, supra note 53 (dis-
cussing the discretionary powers left to the Commission). 
 71 See, e.g., President Jimmy Carter, Staggers Rail Act of 1980 Statement on Signing S. 
1946 into Law (Oct. 14 1980), available at http://bit.ly/1vTZjVd (advocating for the elimi-
nation of unnecessary regulations that hampered the ability of the U.S. railroad industry to 
evolve). 
 72 The Second Presidential Debate of 2008: Between Senators John McCain and Bar-
rack Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2008), http://nyti.ms/1sxGBbs (statements by then Sen. 
Barack Obama). 
 73 Larry Downes, Uber’s Battle in Seattle Highlights the Irony in Regulation Hurting 
the Consumers it was Designed to Help, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 
2014),http://wapo.st/1roxWUH. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Howard Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Towards a New Model for 
Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59, 62 (2007). 
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fully eleven years before the FCC ended its price regulation of AT&T’s long-
distance services.76 
There are several sources for regulatory inertia.77  We highlight three of par-
ticular relevance for the communications sector. First, the mismatch between 
FCC regulations and the realities of the markets it oversees are increasingly 
driven by the innovations that have become routine in communications.78 For 
example, federal policies designed to promote universal service were largely 
crafted in the 1980s in the wake of the divestiture of AT&T.79 Today, those 
policies generate billions of dollars of annual expenditures to promote univer-
sal voice service directed largely at the household level.80  
Yet household-level wireline connectivity has been rapidly marginalized by 
over 335 million mobile subscriptions in the United States.81  Mobile technolo-
gy provides virtually all “of age” members of nearly every household access to 
communications capabilities on a 24 hour-a-day basis regardless of location.82  
Connectivity today is massively higher today than even a decade ago.83 But 
while rapid cycles of innovation have led to widespread deployment of mobile 
devices with increasing versatility, regulatory reform of universal service pro-
grams continue to progress incrementally.84   
More broadly speaking, even as the FCC has shifted its focus in recent years 
toward policies that enhance competitiveness and markets that discipline them-
selves, much of the FCC’s regulatory structure is a vestige of an era that be-
lieved communication services fit the definition of a natural monopoly.85  Thus, 
despite substantial substitution away from legacy PSTN service, the FCC has 
                                                            
 76 Id. 
 77 See, e.g., id. at 59-60 (2007) (discussing the objectives of regulation). 
 78 Economides, supra note 12. 
 79 See, e.g., Shelanski, supra note 75, at 62 (giving background on the AT&T divesti-
ture). 
 80 See Universal Service, FCC, http://fcc.us/1yWBGm7 (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) 
(the Commission’s stated goals from October 2011 included, “[e]nsure universal availability 
of voice and broadband to homes…”, and “[e]nsure the availability of mobile voice, and 
broadband where Americans live…”). 
 81 CTIA’s Wireless Industry Summary Report, Year-End 2013 Results, 2014, CTIA 
http://bit.ly/1yWBOli (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 82 See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Macher et al., Universal Service: Now It’s Getting Personal, 
(Sept. 2014) (on file with authors at Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy). 
 83 See generally Brian S. Hall, The Numbers are Clear: Mobile is Taking Over the 
World, READWRITE (May 13, 2013), http://bit.ly/12ZJrJW (providing a graph showing the 
growth in mobile-cellular subscribers from since 2005). 
 84 See, e.g., Shelanski, supra note 75, at 60. 
 85 See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the Public Switched Telephone 
Network, 66 FED. COMM. L. J. 205, 218 (2014) (“For much of its history, its primary role in 
telecommunications consisted of overseeing AT&T, which was the government-sanctioned 
monopoly provider of telephone service to most Americans. In recent decades, it has it has 
shifted its efforts toward fostering and overseeing a competitive telecommunications market-
place.”). 
26 The Evolution of Innovation and the Evolution of Regulation [Vol. 23 
been slow to transition from monopoly-style public utility requirements over 
local exchange carriers.86  For example, the FCC’s “Traffic damage claims 
rules” were established in 1936 to “address issues with claims against tele-
graph carriers arising from errors in, or delayed delivery or non-delivery of, 
messages and money orders.”87  Innovation made the telegraph obsolete long 
ago, yet it took a costly external petition and regulatory proceeding before the 
FCC acknowledged that “advances in technology such as voicemail, texting, 
smartphones, and digital payment options are ubiquitous” rendering the regula-
tions unnecessary.88  The regulations were not retired until 2013.89  
Second, existing regulatory structures may fail to adapt to changes in the 
scope and applicability of competing and complementary regulatory institu-
tions.90  FCC regulation does not operate in a vacuum.  The policy decisions 
and regulatory implementations of related institutions—include state and local 
regulators, international bodies such as the International Telecommunications 
Union, NGOs including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and other 
federal regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department 
of Justice—can trigger the need for reform of FCC policies and rules.91  The 
residual value of existing FCC rules and policies must be considered within 
that larger context.  When complementary or substitute governance mecha-
nisms change, so should the FCC’s regulatory institutions and rules. But the 
evolution of one regulatory domain in response to changes in another is rare.  
The FCC’s regulatory scope and rules have proven stubbornly unresponsive to 
efforts by other regulators to provide consumer protections in overlapping 
realms.92 
Third, political forces also contribute to regulatory inertia.93  By its very na-
ture, regulation institutionalizes a distribution of benefits among economic 
                                                            
 86 See, e.g., Shelanski, supra note 75, at 56 (stating that despite substantial changes in 
telecommunications markets since the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that 
“much of the regulatory approach to local telecommunications that arose in the monopoly 
era remains in place today.”). 
 87 In the Matter of United States Telecom Association Petition for Forbearance Under 
47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Enforcement of Certain Legacy Telecommunications Regulations, 
Order, WC Docket No. 12-61, 28 FCC Rcd. 2605 para. 9 (Feb. 28, 2013). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at paras. 15-17. 
 90 Id. at paras. 12, 15. 
 91 Cf., Shelanski, supra note 75, at 101-02 (explaining ex post competition enforcement 
of the telecommunications industry as analogous to rule-of-reason scrutiny under U.S. anti-
trust laws). 
 92 See generally Charles Goldfarb, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33034, TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS ACT: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND REFORM 6 (Aug. 12, 2005). 
 93 Economides, supra note 12, at 49. 
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actors that is different than would occur under a laissez faire regime.94  These 
benefits give rise to vested interests to either maintain or eliminate regulation.95  
While political positions of parties championing more, or less, regulation may 
align with sound regulation, quite often industry members will embrace what 
has been referred to by one FCC Commissioner as a “please regulate my rival” 
strategy, applying rent-seeking behavior as a substitute for in-market competi-
tion.96 In the face of conflicting and vocal demands by industry players, inertia 
and a “give everybody a little something” approach to regulation can result.97  
This inertia is considerably more prone to generate unintended negative conse-
quences in rapidly evolving industries such as those overseen by the FCC.98  
Another political source of regulatory inertia that has been well-documented 
stems not from the pressures brought by firms but rather from regulators them-
selves.99  Indeed, history has shown that it is quite difficult for regulators not to 
regulate even when it is in the public interest to eliminate unnecessary regula-
tion.100  As one scholar observed:  
It is very difficult for people and organizations to conclude that despite their best ef-
forts their policies or programs are ineffective. … [T]hose who are deeply involved in 
the implementation of a particular regulation are likely to see the benefits of such a 
project far more clearly than the costs.101 
These sources of inertia in regulatory change are not, of course, unique to 
the FCC.  For example, a study of state-level public utility commission deci-
sion-making found that the prospects for state-level deregulation of long-
distance price controls were significantly enhanced by external legislative 
                                                            
 94 See T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman, & John W. Mayo, A Graphical Exposi-
tion of Economic Theory of Regulation, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 592, 593 (2007). 
 95 Id. at 594. 
 96 See Hon. Robert M. McDowell, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Associazione EGO and PuntoIT Italian Parliament Aula dei Gruppi Parlamentari in Rome, 
Italy, The Siren Call of “Please Regulate My Rival”: A Recipe for Regulatory Failure, FCC 
5 (Jun. 28, 2012), http://fcc.us/1IVLekr . 
 97 See generally id. at 10. 
 98 See id. at 9. 
 99 See e.g., Thomas M. Burton, Regulators Faulted for “Inertia” Over Meningitis Con-
cerns, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://on.wsj.com/1uR06qt (“A Congressional report on 
Thursday released details of how federal and state regulators knew nearly a decade ago of 
serious safety concerns with the pharmacy tied to hundreds of meningitis cases, but failed to 
act.…’[B]ureacratic inertia appears to be what allowed a bad actor to repeatedly risk public 
health.’”) (quoting the bipartisan Senate Health, education, Labor and Pensions Committee 
staff report). 
 100 See Over-regulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), 
http://econ.st/1sv8sDm (“Governments of both parties keep adding stacks of rules, few of 
which are ever rescinded.…There are nine codes relating to injuries caused by parrots, and 
three relating to burns from flaming water-skis.”). 
 101 Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and 
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 119 (David Moss & John Cisternino, 
eds., 2009). 
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measures that acted to break regulatory inertia.102  Similar tendencies by regula-
tors to maximize regulatory reach are likely to exist at the FCC as well.103  This 
creates the risk that new-age IP services will be swept into old and tattered 
regulatory nets despite an absence of compelling market failures or an assess-
ment that the benefits of such regulation exceed their costs.104  
The routinization of innovation in the communications sector, together with 
the inherently incremental nature of regulatory change, generate increasing 
conflict for both the design and scope of regulation in this rapidly evolving 
market.105 These incongruities are generating increasing tension among regula-
tors, ecosystem stakeholders and consumers.106  But they also provide the op-
portunity - both the incentive and foundation - for regulation that evolves in a 
more dynamic, responsive manner.  In the next section, we highlight a policy 
framework that reconciles the tensions between the evolution of innovation 
and the evolution of regulation, helping the latter to evolve on similar lines as 
the former.  
IV. RECONCILING THE INCONGRUITY: A RESULTS-BASED 
REGULATION APPROACH  
Recently one of the authors proposed a framework, known as Results-Based 
Regulation (RBR), designed to minimize the unintended consequences of the 
diverging evolutions of regulation and innovation.107  This framework, rooted 
in core economic principles, offers regulators general guideposts for assessing 
the merits of alternative governance choices for dynamic industries. It is par-
ticularly apt for the evolving communications sector.108  
                                                            
 102 David L. Kaserman, John W. Mayo & Patricia L. Pacey, The Political Economy of 
Deregulation: The Case of Intrastate Long Distance, 5 J. OF REG. ECON. 49, 54 (1993). 
 103 See Beard et al.,,supra note 95, at 593 (discussing the incentive for regulators to op-
timize their own influence in affecting the policy process). 
 104 See id. 
 105 See generally Mayo, supra note 15, at 138 (stating the principle that regulators must 
be vigilant in responding to the innovation and evolution of industries and institutions). 
 106 Id. at 136 
 107 Mayo, supra note 15, at 121. 
 108 Several students of the industry have observed the absence of a general framework 
for guiding policy as the communications sector transitions to IP-based services. See, e.g., 
Werbach, supra note 85, at 236 (“For much of its history, its primary role in telecommunica-
tions consisted of overseeing AT&T, which was the government-sanctioned monopoly pro-
vider of telephone service to most Americans. In recent decades, it has it has shifted its efforts 
toward fostering and overseeing a competitive telecommunications marketplace.”) (“The 
FCC has not adopted principles for what forms of regulation should remain in the shift from 
TDM to IP, and what may be abandoned.”); see also Jodie Griffin & Harold Feld, Five Fun-
damentals for the Phone Network Transition, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE app. 23 (Jul. 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1AfwqXJ  (addressing the need for a policy framework for the IP transition); This 
absence of a consistent framework for guiding policy is not new. In fact, John Stuart Mill 
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While the general case for adoption of the RBR framework has been argued 
elsewhere,109 application of the framework is all the more compelling in indus-
tries defined by routinized disruptive innovation.110  As shown in Sections II 
and III, the accelerating pace of disruptive innovation in the communications 
sector presents special challenges for policymakers.  In this section, we provide 
a sketch of RBR with a special focus on its applicability and implications for 
the FCC in the transition to a converged IP-based communications ecosystem. 

























                                                                                                                                         
noted that as early as 1859 “[t]here is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety 
or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested.” JOHN SUTART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 9 (1859). For an extended discussion on this point, see Mayo, 
supra note 15, at 131-32 (2013) (introducing this framework for the first time). 
 109 Mayo, supra note 15, at 121 (introducing this framework for the first time); see, e.g., 
Regulatory White Paper: Results-Based Regulation: A Modern Approach to Modernize the 
Grid, GEN. ELECTRIC DIGITAL ENERGY, http://bit.ly/1IVMfZx (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
 110 See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 14 (2013), available at 
http://bit.ly/1cSsdLV. 
 111 See generally Mayo, supra note 15, at 137-45. 
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Principle 1: RECOGNIZE THE INEVITABILITY OF IMPER-
FECTION  
      All market governance mechanisms are, in practice, imperfect.  
Principle 2: SMARTLY EVOLVE POLICY WITH TECHNOLO-
GY AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS  
 In the presence of disruptive technological innovation and the 
evolution of complementary and/or competing regulatory structures, 
regulators must be vigilant to the increased likelihood of a corresponding 
imperative to reform existing regulatory or deregulatory policies and 
practices. 
Principle 3: BENCHMARK AND EXPERIMENT RELENTLESS-
LY 
 Wherever possible, regulators should engage in empirical coun-
terfactual scrutiny of, and experimentation with, alternative market gov-
ernance mechanisms. 
Principle 4: USE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, NOT ABSTRACT 
THEORY 
 In assessing the merits of alternative market governance mecha-
nisms, regulators should heavily weight granular empirical evidence col-
lected from actual markets over abstract and formulaic tests and theoret-
ical models. 
Principle 5: FOCUS ON END-STATE ECONOMIC MEASURES 
 In choosing among alternative governance structures for a mar-
ket, regulators should focus on tangible, end-state measures of economic 
value.  
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At face value, Principle 1 is both obvious and profound, yet it is all too often 
ignored in policymaking.  Once removed from textbook cases that assume 
away unavoidable economic and political realities, all governance mechanisms 
– both markets and regulation – are imperfect.112  Accordingly, policy choices 
that weigh a more market-oriented solution against a more regulatory-oriented 
approach should be decided on pragmatic grounds after careful consideration 
of the costs and benefits of all proposed alternatives.  While this is important in 
relatively static industries, it is especially true in industries, such as communi-
cations, that are evolving rapidly.113  Innovation is bringing consumer services 
to the marketplace at a dizzying pace.114  As explained in Section II, it is myop-
ic to continue treating this innovation as a series of accidental “one-offs” that 
have fortuitously benefited society.115  Rather, these innovations are the “new 
normal.”116  Their continuation is virtually certain, permitting — indeed man-
dating — that policymakers incorporate this essential characteristic into policy 
design. 
In dynamic environments, the relative costs and benefits of alternative gov-
ernance mechanisms are often dramatically different from more static indus-
tries.117  In an environment of rapid innovation, for example, the costs of regu-
latory fine-tuning are increased.118  Even the most well-intentioned regulators 
will be challenged to produce and keep current detailed rules that maximize 
consumer benefits and minimize consumer harms when innovators are chang-
ing their technology platforms, services offered and business models at break-
neck speed.119 Turning up the “regulatory volume” in this environment will 
                                                            
 112 See Market Structures: Imperfect Competition, POLICONOMICS, http://bit.ly/1cSsdLV 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (virtually all real world markets are imperfect); see also Over-
regulated America, supra note 100 (discussing the complexity of Dodd-Frank as illustrated 
by hundred of pages of clarifications and thousands of questions offered to help understand 
the regulations within). 
 113 See Tom Wheeler, Net Effects: The Past, Present, and Future Impact of Our Net-
works 28, FCC (Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://bit.ly/1BRuvwo (discussing the im-
portance of government regulation continuously adapting in the same way that private busi-
ness does). 
 114 See id. (explaining various symptoms and reactions to the speed which innovation has 
altered the global marketplace). 
 115 Supra Section II. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See e.g., Michael Powell, The FCC and Competition, Nat’l. J. (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/1vU1KXI (addressing the Clinton Administration’s warning that the Internet is 
“unique” and therefore the traditional regulatory model imposes several adverse costs on the 
future of broadband). 
 118 Id. (statement of Federal Communications Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler). 
 119 Heavy regulation and the regulatory machinery cannot keep pace with advances and 
often kills innovation. See id. 
32 The Evolution of Innovation and the Evolution of Regulation [Vol. 23 
lead to “regulatory drag” on the industry, increasing the risk of unintentionally 
retarding welfare-enhancing innovation.120  
This point is directly relevant to a number of specific regulatory decisions 
emerging at the FCC.121  For example, debates have emerged recently on the 
prospect of extending legacy Title II regulation to Internet-based services.122  
Yet, it is the development and largely unregulated adoption of IP technology 
that is enabling the continuous flow of innovative consumer services.123  The 
fact of this transition and the consumer welfare-enhancing aspects of that inno-
vation argue strongly against extending inherently more static Title II regula-
tion in whole or in part to the Internet.124  Routine innovation substantially rais-
es the cost of regulation in this space.125  A continuing policy of light-touch, ex 
post market correctives has worked exceptionally well for IP technologies.  
Meanwhile, state and federal common carrier rules have retarded the ability of 
the PSTN network to adapt and compete.126  
                                                            
 120 See Michael Powell, supra note 117. 
 121 See id. (on the Net Neutrality debate). 
 122 Daniel A. Lyons, The Challenge of VoIP to Legacy Federal and State Regulatory 
Regimes, 8 PROSPECTIVES FROM FREE ST. FOUND. SCHOLARS 2 (2013), available at 
http://bit.ly/1vU1ZSJ . 
 123 See Fred Campbell, America’s Internet Transformation Demands an All-IP Future, 
THE TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Oct. 31, 2012), http://bit.ly/1sxIPHM 
If telephone companies must continue to maintain outdated and inefficient switched 
networks while their unregulated broadband competitors reap the benefits of modern 
network technologies, telephone companies will continue to lack incentives to invest in 
all-IP networks. In the long run, they would be unable to compete with cable operators 
and other providers of IP-based services who are not required to maintain inefficient, 
duplicative networks. 
Id. 
 124 See John W. Mayo, Beyond Ideology: A Results-Based Approach, DEMOCRACY J., 21-
27 (Fall 2014), http://bit.ly/1GpNM8d (stating that the fact of an existing regulatory authori-
ty does not support the economic argument for exercising it). 
 125 Scott McGrath, Net Neutrality and Title II: Increased Cost and Decreased Innova-
tion?, AEI (Jul. 24, 2014, 3:32 PM), http://bit.ly/1wAvDRW, quoting Bret Swanson, a visit-
ing fellow at the American Enterprise Institute’s Center for Internet, Communications, and 
Technology Policy: 
The substance of Title II common carrier regulation, however, is very real, and it could 
deal a huge blow to the Internet economy. Title II means price regulation. It means ask-
ing Washington and the state utility commissions for permission to launch new prod-
ucts, change existing ones, or deploy new technology, and to approve marketing and 
advertising programs. It means hundreds of other rules that were written for the mo-
nopoly telephone network 80 years ago but that would now apply to the vastly different 
Internet environment. 
Id. 
 126 See Jeff Pulver, Freedom to Innovate Key to Internet Future, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 
2014 7:34 PM), http://usat.ly/1ARnwio (stating that Light-touch approach has been the pre-
vailing wisdom for VoIP since 2003); see also Larry Downes, The End of the Wired Tele-
phone Network is Coming…But Not Soon Enough, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://onforb.es/1DE8AKY. 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 33 
In short, the routinization of innovation in the communications sector raises 
the costs of regulatory intervention even as it lowers the cost of market forces 
to evolve quickly to reduce market failures that harm consumers.127  This, of 
course, does not mean that regulators should necessarily fold up their tents and 
go home.  However, it does mean that they should approach the communica-
tions sector cautiously.  As Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner 
Maureen Ohlhausen recently noted:  
The success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the freedom to experiment 
with different business models, the best of which have survived and thrived, even in 
the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and com-
petitors. It is thus vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technolo-
gies with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and oth-
ers about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the marketplace, 
identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider whether existing 
laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before assuming that new rules are 
required.128 
Principle 2 explicitly recognizes the impact on existing governance struc-
tures of both routinized technological disruption and the evolution of other 
regulatory institutions.  In the case of the communications sector, both forces 
are clearly visible.129  As noted, rapid and sustained technological disruption 
alters the relative merits of market vs. command-and-control governmental 
regulation.130 Fundamentally, constant innovation points toward a general prin-
ciple of “regulatory humility.”131  
Technological innovation shifts the balance not only for the optimal regula-
tory “volume” but also the form such rules should take. Much of the FCC’s 
regulatory structure was devised in an era in which telecommunications was 
widely believed to function as a natural monopoly, with competitors seen as 
“fringe” economic actors operating in the shadow of a  “dominant” incum-
bent.132 Today, students of the communications sector have rightly discarded 
                                                            
 127 McGrath, supra note 125. 
 128 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Internet of Things: When Things Talk Among Them-
selves, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Nov. 19, 2013),http://1.usa.gov/1AAJWVZ . 
 129 See Emilien Moyon & Xavier Lecocq, Co-evolution between Stages of Institutionali-
zation and Agency: The Case of the Music Industry’s Business Model, 14 MGMT INT’L 37-
38, 51 (2010), available at http://bit.ly/1zjbQHS. 
 130 See Matthew Robinson & Tim Cooper, Regulation Struggles to Keep Pace With Digi-
tal-Driven Disruption, RE/CODE (July 3, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://bit.ly/1zjbQHS (“It is just 
that disruptive service providers, by their very nature, innovate at a speed that makes it 
harder than ever for regulators to balance the needs of value-seeking and innovation-hungry 
consumers with the needs of the very industries they regulate.”). 
 131 See Ohlhausen, supra note 128, at 1. 
 132 See Frank Darr, NAT’L REG. RES. INST., A REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE ON DOMINANCE 
IN NETWORK MARKETS 1, 2 (2000); see also Bob Latta, Regulation Would Stifle Internet 
Innovation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jun. 23, 2014, 8:00AM), http://bit.ly/137ZiGa (pre-
dicting that the reclassification of broadband would impose 80 years of regulatory baggage 
and would substantially restrict providers). 
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the idea of natural monopoly as the driving policy rationale for this sector.133  
The market has long ceased to resemble your mother’s (Ma Bell’s) natural 
monopoly.  While one can debate the optimal design of regulatory governance 
in this new era, there can be little doubt that legacy institutions and the regula-
tions they enforce must evolve accordingly.  
The largely organic emergence of a fully competitive IP platform has given 
firms vast opportunities to cross traditional industry boundaries, effectively 
challenging rivals that were formerly securely entrenched.134  That innovation 
has produced companies like Google, Skype, Netflix, Amazon, Twitter, and 
Uber that rely on the digital infrastructure of the Internet is not in dispute.135  
Consumers, hooked on ever-better and ever-cheaper information goods and 
services, demand rapid innovation and dissemination of voice, data and video 
services.136  
Principle 2 speaks not only of the impact on governance structures of rapid-
ly-evolving technologies but also of other legal and regulatory institutions in 
response to the same stimuli.  Scholars have observed that the rise of the 20th 
century “regulatory state” occurred at a time of weak legal institutions.137  The-
se institutions, however, have since evolved and matured.  For example, while 
both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice were immature at the time of the FCC’s founding, they 
have now developed into fully-functioning agencies that collectively act to 
prohibit “contract[s], combination[s] and conspiracy[ies] in restraint of trade,” 
“monopoliz[ation] and attempts to monopolize”138 and “unfair methods of 
competition.”139   
Principle 2 argues that the maturation of these alternative institutions should 
lead policymakers to reconsider the need for extending, or even maintaining, 
                                                            
 133 Contra Susan Crawford, The Communications Crises in America, 5 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV 245, 246 (2011) 
 134 Id. at 256, 258 (explaining how the “TV Everywhere” model is shaping market access 
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 136 See Seth Priebatsch, 5 Consumer-Driven Technologies That Will Reshape Society, 
FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 31, 2013, 6:02 AM), http://bit.ly/1GK5Fgc. 
 137 See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. OF 
ECON. LIT. 401, 407-08 (2003) (discussing the rise of regulatory responses to perceived so-
cial harm in the first half of the 20th century and the notion that the administrative had re-
placed the judiciary). 
 138 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012). 
 139 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1912). 
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sector-specific regulation in the communications industries. For instance, as 
the PSTN transitions from regulated common carriage services to non-common 
carriage IP services, the consumer protection oversights afforded by the FTC 
Act become operative. 140  There may be a positive role for the FCC to play in 
the inter-agency governance of a new IP-based, post PSTN, industry, but this 
role must not be assumed to be the same as in a very different past where other 
regulators with other kinds of expertise were absent from the field.  
Principle 2 also requires that as technologies evolve, the legacy structure of 
existing regulatory bodies must also change in response.  Digital convergence 
has erased distinctions “between voice and data, between broadcast and tele-
phone, between television, radio, and ‘other,’ between wired and wireless, be-
tween modes of transit including copper, cable, satellite, radio, fiber, power 
line, between carriers private or public, single mode or intermodal.”141  We use 
computers to watch television and make phone calls; we use phones and televi-
sions to process data.  Yet despite the substantial IP-based convergence of mo-
bile, wireline video, data and voice communications in the last decade, the 
FCC is statutorily designed to maintain separate bureaus for the regulation of 
broadcast TV and radio, wired communications, and wireless services.142   
Continuing to force-fit increasingly round technologies into stubbornly 
square regulatory pegs creates the profound risk of deterring effective and effi-
cient policymaking. Principle 2 argues against continuing this stovepipe struc-
ture, a relic from the era when these services were only distantly related from 
both a technical and economic standpoint.143  The failure to evolve the structure 
of the agency leads to anachronistic and increasingly meaningless assessments 
of competition for “wireline” services and “wireless” services as though those 
services were not meaningful substitutes in the minds of consumers.144  
 Similarly, absent the evolution of its structure, the Commission will contin-
ue to treat every digital innovation as a special case requiring special 
rules.  First there were special rules for Voice over IP, then for television over 
IP, and now for radio over IP.145  But these aren’t exceptions.  Continued IP-
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based innovations are the new normal, and regulatory structures must evolve to 
recognize this reality.  As then-Commissioner Kathleen Abernathy presciently 
observed in 2004, the agency needs to stop making exceptions and reorganize 
itself for a future version of communications technology and applications 
based on “everything over IP.”146  Similarly, Phil Weiser has observed that:  
[o]ver time, the FCC will thus need to shift its focus from specific regulatory ap-
proaches based on the particular technology platform-say, a distinct regime for satel-
lite, wireless, cable, or telephone networks-to a ‘layered model’ of telecommunica-
tions regulation that regulates functionally similar services in the same way regardless 
of the underlying platform.147   
Principle 2 also evokes yet another important consideration regarding gov-
ernance.  In particular, experimentation lies at the heart of both technological 
and business innovation.148  In order to succeed in the rapidly evolving com-
munications environment, firms are driven to experiment with which techno-
logical innovations to pursue, which to introduce into the market, and what 
business models will be most palatable for consumers as new innovations enter 
the market.149  
While it is commonly understood and appreciated that new entrants are rich 
sources of innovations and experimentation, all firms (including incumbents) 
have substantial incentives to engage in experimentation and innovation in a 
marketplace as dynamic as the modern communications sector. Regulatory 
restrictions on this experimentation can be a direct impediment to innovation 
                                                            
 146 Broadband is Key to the Information Society, Global Symposium for Regulators: 
Special Report, INTER-AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATION COMMISSION, (Feb. 2005), available 
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tion, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2001), available at http://bit.ly/1AfAoQ4 (proposing that the 
systematic testing of ideas is what enables companies to innovate only after refining a solu-
tion through thousands of experiments). 
 149 See id. (describing Toyota’s efforts in the 1990’s to accelerate its product develop-
ment cycle in order to keep up with rapidly changing consumer tastes). 
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itself.150   
Experimentation and the rapid evolution of both services and business mod-
els, however, creates the potential of customer confusion and harm.  Thus, a 
natural question arises regarding the most suitable type of regulation in such an 
environment. Outside the communications industry this tension routinely arises 
and is successfully dealt with by the ex post facto enforcement of contract law 
and the bedrock consumer protection enforcement of the FTC.  Prominent 
scholars who have studied the communications sector have advocated that the 
FCC’s current rule-based, ex ante regime be replaced by a set of ex post en-
forcements.151  Indeed, as noted as early as 2007, “on dimensions of both pric-
ing and innovation, today’s telecommunications firms perform more like com-
petitors than like monopolists whose market power requires ex ante re-
straint.”152 Of course, since 2007 pricing and innovation have only continued to 
improve, making the case for ex post enforcement even stronger today than 
when it was first advocated.153  In sum, the emerging role of experimentation in 
the dynamic communications sector reduces the relative merits of ex ante pub-
lic utility-style regulation while raising the prospect of consumer protections in 
the form of ex post enforcement mechanisms.154 
Next consider Principle 3.  This principle encourages regulators to consider 
alternative forms of governance through counterfactual analysis and experi-
mentation.  The dynamic nature of the communications sector makes the pay-
offs from adhering to this principle especially high, but also especially chal-
lenging.  The dynamic nature of the industry translates to a wide range of in-
fluences and influencers all of whom can drive different market outcomes, 
with regulation being only one.  In that sense, regulators will find it difficult in 
their analysis to isolate the effects of a particular regulation or regulatory poli-
cy alternative.  The solution, again, is carefully designed and measured exper-
iments that generate hard data for analysis.  This is perhaps the most signifi-
cant process improvement the FCC can make in its move to a regulatory model 
suitable for the 21st century.155   
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 151 See Shelanski, supra note 75, at 101. 
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 153 See Hong Soonho, Regulation System Study for Innovative Communication Services, 
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Indeed, in a variety of other policymaking venues, randomized trials have 
made it possible to separate effective from ineffective policy alternatives at 
relatively low cost and risk.156  These trials include applications ranging from 
housing policies to economic development policies to social welfare programs.  
Prominent economists have embraced such trials in both policy and business 
applications.157  They have become the gold standard for designing policies.158  
Principle 3 calls for significantly expanded use of such experiments and other 
counterfactual analysis to smartly evolve the regulatory process.159  
Beyond randomized trials, the FCC may benefit from carefully drawn 
benchmark analysis that is cross-sectional in nature (comparing the effects of 
different policies adopted by different governing bodies) or inter-temporal 
(comparing the effects of policies adopted by the FCC during one period with 
the outcomes of policies adopted during a different period).160 
In the advance of Principle 3, the FCC is to be commended for approving a 
process for assessing the best policy path for the transition of the aging PSTN 
network to the all-IP network where consumers are increasingly relocating. As 
noted in its recent Order authorizing geographically select trials of the imple-
mentation of an IP network, “[t]he experiments and initiatives will collect data 
that will permit service providers and their customers, and independent ana-
lysts and commentators – as well as the federal, state, local, and tribal officials 
charged with oversight – to make data-driven decisions about these technology 
transitions.”161 
Principle 4 indicates that the FCC should focus on granular empirical evi-
                                                                                                                                         
(Fall 2014), available at http://bit.ly/1DQJubS. 
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Cisternino eds. 2009) (listing the use of randomized trials in job training programs, educa-
tion policy, environmental policy, and healthcare policy). 
 158 Greenstone, supra note 157, at 116; see Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomizing 
Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research, 9 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63, 66-67 (1995) 
(giving an early review of the topic). 
 159 Mayo, supra note 15, at 140. 
 160 Mayo, id. at 146 (suggesting that regulators might consider different metrics at differ-
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and California with differing results achieved through regulation in England). 
 161 Tech Transitions Order, 29 FCC Rcd 1433, para. 1. 
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dence collected from actual markets as a core task in any regulatory process.  
The intent of this recommendation is to emphasize that in a dynamic and fluid 
industry characterized by constant innovation, the value of abstract theory is 
especially low relative to information gleaned from specific empirical assess-
ments of agreed-upon performance indicators.162   
While there are many potential pitfalls for regulators attempting to imple-
ment this principle, two are worrisome at this critical juncture of the evolution 
of the communications industry.  First, the Commission has historically and 
appropriately embraced competition as an important “value” that should guide 
regulatory policymaking.163 As shown through generations of economic analy-
sis, competition between providers of goods and services has the potential to 
do, via the invisible hand, what no central planning or governmental directive 
can:  incentivize firms to offer high quality services at attractive prices while 
continuing to innovate.  In effect, the erstwhile vice of greed is turned, in a 
competitive setting, into a virtue, propelling a continuous cycle of innovation 
and gains for consumer welfare.164  This virtuous cycle inures to the benefit of 
consumers, relieving regulators from applying their “heavy” (and neither invis-
ible nor costless) hands to promote such salubrious effects.  For this reason, the 
pursuit of competition in the communications industry, all agree, is a worthy 
public policy goal.165 
The question, though, is how best to assess and promote competition within 
the rapidly evolving “global multimedia communications infrastructure” sec-
tor.166  A look at current regulatory practice is not encouraging. By congres-
sional directive, for example, the Commission reviews annually the state of 
competition in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services sector.167  In recent 
years, however, and even as agency staff do a heroic job of collecting relevant, 
detailed empirical evidence on the fast-changing industry, the Commission has 
relied heavily in its analysis on abstract models drawn from economic theory; 
in particular, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentra-
tion.168   
While such constructs are not without value in economic theory, Principle 3 
argues that their predictive value is significantly diluted in industries character-
ized by rapid innovation.  Indeed, while a positive relationship between indus-
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try concentration and prices can sometimes be demonstrated in a static and 
particularly stylized setting of competition, economic theory also recognizes 
the potential for robust competition in markets with significant industry con-
centration.169 The uncoupling of concentration and competition is made all the 
more pronounced in dynamic industries characterized by constant Big Bang-
style disruptions.  Market leadership is increasingly short-lived, with new en-
trants able to deploy low cost, versatile technologies, effectively lowering en-
try barriers.170  
Thus, Principle 4 urges the FCC to elevate the role of empirical assessments 
over abstract economic concepts in the increasingly dynamic markets the 
agency oversees. Why?  As shown dramatically in Figure 4, concerns regard-
ing the price-elevating effects of market concentration by simple application of 
the theory-based measure of mobile industry concentration by the HHI are flat-
ly contradicted by empirical evidence of actual industry behavior.  Between 
2002 and 2012, overall industry concentration increased substantially.171  Yet 
the FCC’s own data shows that during this period, retail prices for mobile ser-
vices plummeted.172  Real-world evidence reveals prices correlating inversely 
with industry concentration, utterly defying the HHI-based concerns and un-
derscoring the severe limits of its predictive value in this context.173   
Of course we do not mean to suggest that this one example should substitute 
for a voluminous and detailed assessment of competition.  Principle 4, howev-
er, does indicate that where presented with both high-level theoretical concepts 
and granular retail data, the Commission should place substantial weight in 
drawing policy conclusions on the latter, especially in a market in which rou-
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A second prominent fault line that separates the role of high-level theorizing 
and the use of granular empirical evidence collected from actual markets has 
recently erupted over spectrum auction design.175  This time, the theoretical 
problem concerns the potential harm in the upcoming voluntary incentive auc-
tion of bidders gaming their bids based on “foreclosure value.”176   The theory 
is that large bidders may spend more for a particular license than the amount 
they actually value or attribute to that license in order to foreclose smaller ri-
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vals who may value the license more but who cannot afford an inflated price.177  
A foreclosure value bid will consequently distort auction results, with potential 
harm to future competition.178  
This concern, however, is based entirely on speculation.179  The empirical 
evidence is quite to the contrary.180  The actual data reveal that unfettered auc-
tions conducted since the mid-1990s have been remarkably successful in pro-
ducing increased output, enhanced consumer value, innovation and falling 
prices.181  While a full assessment of this specific issue is beyond the scope of 
the present article, Principle 4 provides an important guidepost for how regula-
tors might meaningfully sort the various conflicting claims that have circled 
this issue.  
Finally, consider Principle 5, which states that regulators should focus on 
tangible end-state metrics when fashioning more future-proof regulation.  The-
se metrics include a detailed focus on prices, output, investment and innova-
tion.182  They can be thought of as “retail” metrics – direct indicators of the 
health of the evolving ecosystem.  If prices, output, investment and innovation 
data provide positive indications, then regulatory controls can be confidently 
removed.  This is in direct contrast to an approach which would seek to identi-
fy potential, anomalous or speculative consumer harms and then design regula-
tions that may head them off--regulations that are, to use a popular FCC term, 
“prophylactic” in nature.183 In rapidly evolving markets, however, ex ante regu-
lations based on speculative harms introduce the profound and unnecessary 
risk of unintentionally constraining innovative behaviors, actually harming 
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both consumer welfare and the ability of the industry to evolve organically.   
 
V. RBR IN PERSPECTIVE 
We have advocated an economic framework for advancing sound policy-
making as the industry transitions from a TDM, voice-based, communications 
platform to an IP voice-data-video communications platform. Our proposal, 
however, is only one of several possible paths that policymakers may walk in 
their quest for a 21st century approach.  Indeed, policy proposals are routinely 
met with a flood of competing comments and opinions. For example, a recent 
House of Representatives Committee white paper on industry governance pro-
duced no less than 116 comments, totaling 841 pages.184   
A comprehensive review of the alternative frameworks for policy design in 
the industry is well beyond the scope of the current article.  Nonetheless, some 
benchmarking is useful.  Our review suggests that proposals for a transition 
path for the communications sector fall into four broad categories: economic, 
historical/legal, architectural and values-based. We note below each of these 
alternatives (without intention to offend those omitted) and provide a high-
level critique of their advantages and disadvantages.  
A. The Economic Approach 
Section IV detailed RBR, an economic framework for policy design.  The 
distinguishing characteristic of the RBR approach is that it is grounded in 
pragmatic economic principles and economic lessons learned (often the hard 
way) from the practice of regulation over the past fifty years.  Our approach is, 
however, neither new nor alone.185 Indeed, as described elsewhere, the RBR 
approach is substantively related to seminal work of Alfred Kahn, Paul Jos-
kow, Robert Hahn, Cass Sunstein and Stephen Breyer.186  
At a policy level, both Democratic and Republican presidents, from Jimmy 
Carter through Barack Obama, have embraced the application of RBR princi-
ples.187  For example, to accelerate the perceived need to evolve the regulatory 
process, President Obama in 2011 issued an Executive Order requiring execu-
tive agencies to: 
(1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits 
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justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) 
tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent with obtaining 
regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent prac-
ticable, the costs of cumulative regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative 
regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits (including poten-
tial economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distribu-
tive impacts; and equity); (4) to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, 
rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities 
must adopt; and (5) identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, in-
cluding providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user 
fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made 
by the public. 188    
B. Historical/Legal 
A second approach toward regulatory evolution is largely rooted in a histor-
ical and legal context that recognizes the pressures exerted on the regulatory 
system by the routinization of disruptive innovation in the industry and at-
tempts to adapt existing legal frameworks in the interest of preserving historic 
policy goals.189  It likewise argues that rapid technological change has made 
existing regulatory structures “anachronistic.”190  Yet, this approach seeks at its 
heart to maintain the historical continuity of legacy regulation by extending its 
reach to IP-based services.191   
The historical/legal argument begins with a nuanced re-reading of Section 
230(b) of the Communications Act, added in 1996, which describes the policy 
of the United States “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfet-
tered by Federal or State regulation.”192 
The historical/legal argument is that Section 230(b) should not be read as a 
deregulatory mandate, as its prima facie reading would suggest, but rather in a 
way that would legally permit the FCC to impose regulation on the Internet.193  
Arguing that the FCC has legal authority elsewhere in the statute to engage in 
regulation of Internet services, the legal/historical approach then urges the FCC 
to exercise that authority as an adaptation of old policy to new technology: 
“[i]f the Internet is consuming legacy communications and media industries, 
then Internet policy is the new telecommunications policy. The central provi-
sions of the Communications Act must morph to apply to Internet-based sys-
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tems.”194 
Thus, at its core, the historical/legal rationale for extending regulation to the 
Internet is: (a) there is legal authority to do so; and (b) this emerging techno-
logical platform for communications creates services today that are unregulat-
ed under the existing regulatory structure; so (c) traditional regulatory tools 
must be extended to cover these services that have heretofore not been subject 
to FCC regulation.195  
There is much to be said for developing a governance structure that is mind-
ful of the historical evolution of the industry and which offers a sound legal 
framework.  To do so, however, without adhering to RBR principles, creates a 
profound risk that the transplanted regulations will harm rather than promote 
economic welfare.  For instance, where the historical/legal approach argues in 
favor of morphing the regulatory structure applied to legacy communications 
networks onto IP-based services by extending Title II regulation to information 
services, the RBR principles caution against any reflexive regulatory exten-
sion. In particular, application of RBR Principle 1 requires that policymakers 
consider carefully whether regulation of post-PSTN IP-based services will in 
practice extend benefits to consumers that exceed the costs associated with that 
regulation. And in light of the rapid evolution of innovation in this sector, 
Principle 2 dictates that policymakers reconsider the very design of the gov-
ernance structure to promote economic welfare.196 It cautions, therefore, against 
reflexively extending regulation designed in one era onto services in a new era, 
with new market dynamics and a new legal environment. Principles 3-5 urge 
policymakers, in similar fashion, to engage in detailed empirical and counter-
factual analysis, steps all seemingly omitted from the historical/legal approach 
to governance of the communications sector. Thus, the RBR approach imposes 
significant discipline on the historical/legal approach. Whether that discipline 
ultimately complements or contradicts the implications of the historical/legal 
approach to governance, the industry requires a full application of the RBR 
principles to the governance issues at hand.   
Standing alone, the historical/legal approach to the future of regulation is at 
best a two-legged stool.  In particular, it fails in several respects to weigh costs 
and benefits, both for applying existing regulatory structures to new problems 
and to the relative value of alternative governance structures.197  Professor 
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Werbach, for example, describes the many consumer benefits thought to be 
served by a command-and-control approach to voice interconnection, conclud-
ing that these values transcend the transition to all-IP networks that merge 
voice with other forms of communication and content.198  Therefore, he con-
cludes that the FCC should continue its traditional role in mandating intercon-
nection, using the existing statutory foundation of Sections 251 and 252 of the 
Communications Act and related regulations.199  Indeed, he proposes extending 
the interconnection mandates for voice traffic to all IP traffic, including video 
and data traffic that were never subject to such rules.200 
These recommendations, however, fail to weigh the benefits of traditional 
interconnection against the cost to competition and innovation, either in the 
legacy PSTN market or in emerging IP markets.201  Nor are these recommenda-
tions based upon any empirical evidence that the benefits even exist, or their 
scale.  Moreover, there is no consideration of the competing costs or benefits 
of an alternative governance structure, namely, to let the market continue to 
police interconnection for IP traffic as it has done for decades in the form of 
peering and transit agreements, over 99% of which are so straightforward, ac-
cording to the OECD, that the parties do not even bother to reduce them to 
writing.202 
Against this self-evidently efficient form of market-based governance, Wer-
bach offers the anecdotal case of Verizon’s tactical response to the destruction 
of its PSTN network on Fire Island in the wake of Hurricane Sandy.203  Unable 
to expedite or justify the expense of rebuilding an obsolete analog network, 
Verizon initially offered its customers a mobile alternative, a service known as 
VoiceLink.204  As Werbach and others point out, however, VoiceLink is in 
many respects inferior to traditional PSTN, unable to support many analog 
devices such as older fax machines.205  Given that inferiority, Werbach ques-
tions whether IP services are in fact clearly better than traditional PSTN, and 
whether routinized innovation, consequently, serves as an effective market 
regulator over Title II.206 
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But VoiceLink is not, in fact, an IP-based service at all.207  It is a non-
Internet service that operates on older cellular technology.208  It is inferior to 
PSTN, in other words, but has nothing to do with the IP transition.209  So the 
prime example offered for the historical approach to governing IP-based ser-
vices is not, in fact, a relevant example.210  This lack of empirical accuracy 
highlights the limits more broadly of this approach, which would substitute the 
attractive rhetoric of maintaining the FCC’s historical though undefined duty 
to protect the “public interest”211 for a more analytical rigor approach. While 
the former provides continuity, the latter is essential for making policy deci-
sions with the potential to accelerate technological innovation and significantly 
improve the economic lives of consumers.212 
C. Architectural 
Another “framework” proposed for the post-PSTN communications world is 
architectural in nature.  In a recent paper, Taylor and Auriemma offer “a new 
model of the broadband ecosystem,” which they call the “lattice structural 
model.”213 Their paper argues that the lattice structural model offers policy-
makers “a coherent theoretical framework within which to decide what action 
(or forbearance) is appropriate under what conditions.”214 The model, however, 
is simply descriptive, offering a visual depiction of the multidimensional rela-
tionships that exist between the various elements of the broadband ecosys-
tem.215  As a preliminary step toward operationalizing this model, the paper 
examines “capital expenditure and various monetary indicators as a proxy for 
market power.”216  Examining one plane of the broadband ecosystem, the visu-
alization purports to show “the superior market power of Verizon compared to 
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Apple on the Network Operations plane.”217  
Our suggested RBR framework, like that of Taylor and Auriemma, is in-
tended to provide a model for assessing the relative merits of alternative regu-
latory governance structures. It is unclear, however, precisely how the visuali-
zation of the related “planes” of the broadband ecosystem offers more than a 
description of various competing elements.218  Indeed, where the model is 
pushed to offer insights that might, from an economic perspective, guide poli-
cymaking, it simply draws “market power” conclusions from the relative mag-
nitudes of firms’ capital expenditures.219  Expenditures are, however, logically 
unrelated to market power as defined by economists.220 While subsequent de-
velopment of the Taylor-Auriemma approach may create a more coherent plat-
form for policymakers, it has not yet done so.221 
D. Values-Based  
A final platform for guiding policymaking in the communications sector is 
rooted in the enunciation of technology-independent consumer-oriented “val-
ues” to which the FCC should anchor its policymaking.222 A prominent descrip-
tion of the relevant values is offered by Public Knowledge, and include:  (1) 
service to all Americans; (2) competition and interconnection; (3) consumer 
protection; (4) network reliability, and (5) public safety.223 
These values are said to derive from the successes of regulatory policies that 
were adopted as mainstays of 20th century regulation.224  In that respect, the 
“values” share a similarity with RBR principles, which also derive from an 
examination of economically successful historic governance structures.  But 
the changing nature of disruptive technological innovation, discussed in Sec-
tion II above, question the absolute value of prior regulatory mechanisms that 
operated in less dynamic environments.   
Simply put, 20th century values, even those that worked, may have little rel-
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evance for 21st century markets.  In any case, that these values arguably guided 
sound regulatory decision-making does not, ipso facto, lead to the conclusion 
that they remain lodestones for the FCC.225  The RBR principles, on the other 
hand, are fluid enough to support regulatory design that can evolve to accom-
modate and enable rapidly-changing technological innovations.226   In this re-
gard, one concern about the values-based approach is that 20th century success-
es may be inappropriately “cut and pasted” into a 21st century environment, 
with the values themselves lost in translation.  For example, as noted above, 
the maturation of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal 
Trade Commission would seem to dictate a rethinking –rather than a simple 
extrapolation – of FCC governance of consumer protection and competition 
values.227  
The values-based approach also confuses technological change with a 
change in consumer values.  In some cases, valuable features of legacy tech-
nology may be more a historical accident and, even if not offered on the newer 
platforms, does not support a conclusion that routinized innovation will not 
provide more efficient and effective discipline for the market than rules that 
ossify values discovered only in their absence.228   
For example, those who urge a slower implementation of the regulatory re-
lief needed to complete the IP transition point out that IP voice services, in-
cluding cable-based VoIP and over-the-top Internet VoIP, do not generally 
operate with independent power sources outside of battery backups at the us-
er’s site.229  In many cases during failure of the power system during natural 
disasters, they argue, customers of the old PSTN system could still place phone 
calls.230  That “value” must, therefore, be translated into enforceable rules for 
future technologies or used as a brake to slow the transition from old to new.231 
But is backup power aside from batteries a core “value” and, if so, one that 
is relevant to the IP transition?  For one thing, most consumers no longer have 
handsets and can operate on the PSTN network’s independent power source, 
having traded that “value” for the benefit of cordless handsets, answering ma-
chines, and other features that required use of the home power connection at all 
times.232   
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To the extent consumers are still relying on the power backup, it is perverse 
to allow that “value” to serve as the regulatory tail wagging the technology 
dog.  One might better ask why the power grid is so much more likely to fail 
than the PSTN network during natural disasters, or even during more mundane 
weather incidents.  Perhaps it is because the continued regulation of the power 
grid under a strict federal-state public utility model has failed to incentivize 
power generators and distributors from investing in the kind of basic innova-
tion (or even basic maintenance) that would keep these essential services in 
more robust condition.233  The problem, in other words, is not with the technol-
ogy of IP voice services but the weaknesses of the regulated power grid.  If 
emergency access is a core value, we should use it as a basis for ensuring con-
sumers continue to have not only dial-tone but also light, heat, and other essen-
tial services during emergencies.234 
Which is not to say, as we have noted repeatedly, that there is no role for the 
FCC and other regulators in the all-IP world.  Some network values, notably 
emergency services and other public safety uses of the network, may well war-
rant continued, even permanent, intervention, oversight, and direction from 
regulators to assure critical uses of the network are not left purely to market 
forces.235  Indeed, one positive side-effect of the “experimental” approach in-
herent in the RBR framework and which has been adopted by the FCC for the 
IP transition is that it will generate real data, and not ungrounded speculation, 
on what features—and values—consumers truly treasure, especially when they 
are asked to weigh one generation of technologies against another in possible 
trade-offs.236 
The focus of the value-based approach is on “what must be done” by regula-
tors, to generate “commensurate benefits” from the evolving IP-based commu-
nications networks as they did from the traditional phone system.  While the 
focus on core policy goals and associated values is laudable, the RBR Frame-
work provides a number of disciplinary filters to assure that these benefits are 
best met with the appropriate balance of regulatory and market controls.   
Thus, the “values” approach and RBR may be best seen as complementary, 
rather than competitive, frameworks for communications governance in the 
21st century.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Communications Act of 1934 was enacted “to make available, so far as 
possible, to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and 
world-wide wire and radio communications service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charges.”237  Judged by the sparse dissemination of expensive voice 
services then,238 and the essentially ubiquitous nature of voice, video and data 
services today,239 the Communications Act has been wildly successful.  Much 
of this change has occurred only in recent years with the on-going convergence 
of all communications platforms to IP-based technologies which, by all ac-
counts, sets the stage for an amazing set of “next generation” communications 
services that promise to substantially improve the economic lives and welfare 
of Americans.240    
We have documented the evolution of this profound innovation, with a spe-
cial eye on how this progress, in turn, necessitates a corresponding evolution of 
regulatory governance for the associated industries.241  We draw upon and de-
velop the implications of this double evolution for a Results-Based Regulation 
framework.  We do so not to provide regulatory prescriptions but rather to of-
fer a set of economically-rooted principles, which we urge all stakeholders to 
embrace at this critical moment of inflection. 
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